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Abstract 
Since its national implementation in March 2014, the UK Domestic Violence Disclosure 
Scheme (also known as  ‘Clare's Law ?) has enabled thousands of people in England and Wales 
to seek information from the police about whether their partner has a history of 
domestically abusive behaviours. Politicians have hailed the policy on the basis that it 
empowers people to make informed choices about their safety, thus represents a vital part 
of wider domestic violence reduction strategies. This, of course, is all dependent upon 
people knowing the policy exists; being able to apply to it; meeting the relevant criteria; 
there being information to disclose; and this being relayed to the applicant accordingly. 
Drawing on empirical research into the ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŽŶĞƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐarea, this paper 
highlights several discrepancies with respect to how the scheme is functioning. The analysis 
suggests that the hierarchical, two-tier approach to implementation is impacting on 
displaced responsibility and potential risk enhancement, while the symbolic mobilisation of 
domestic violence victims for contemporary political gain is also explored. The paper 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and suggestions on earlier drafts of 
this work. All errors are mine alone.  
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concludes with suggestions for reform to boost the ability of the policy to prevent domestic 
violence and abuse. 
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Introduction 
On 8 March 2014  W /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂǇ Wthe then home secretary Theresa May MP 
implemented the national roll-out of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) 
across England and Wales. The DVDS gives members of the pƵďůŝĐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?the 
police ĂďŽƵƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛhistory of domestic abuse or intimate partner violence. The 
applicant will either be pĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ?, ǁŚŽŝƐŝŶĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ? ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ
application), or ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ?, ǁŚŽŝƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĂĐƚŝŶŐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ?ŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ
application (a parent, for example). There are criteria2 to be met before such information 
can be requested or imparted, but importantly the policy allows access to information 
previously only available to statutory agents. As such, this  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?element of the DVDS 
supplements the existing  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?route already available to those working in the 
statutory sector; this allows them to initiate disclosures of otherwise confidential 
information on a safeguarding or public protection basis as a result of the potential risk to a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇbeing identified. This may be either through the subject having committed a 
                                                          
2 These are that the local decision making forum have the power to disclose the information; that there is 
a pressing need for a disclosure; and that the disclosure is proportionate to the risks identified. There are 
also criteria about who can apply, eitheǮǯǯǮǯǤ 
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crime, or relevant information about the subject having been shared at a safeguarding 
meeting where some risk to a victim has been identified.3  
Several key dŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĞǆŝƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? routes. 
These (respectively) include: who initiates the request (a member of the public, versus a 
professional from the statutory sector); how long it takes to process (up to six weeks, versus 
much more immediately); the level of detail included in the disclosure (scant, versus 
detailed); and the level of post-disclosure statutory engagement with the victim (little to 
none, versus ongoing). In terms of timeframe, the Home Office (2016) policy guidance 
stipulates the following: 
For requests via the  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ? route:  
1. Initial contact checks should be completed within 24 hours of the initial contact 
being made by the applicant.  
2. A face-to-face meeting should take place within 10 working days of step 1.  
3. A full risk assessment should be completed within five working days of step 2. 
4. Cases should then be referred to the local decision making forum within 20 working 
days of step 3.   
For information departed via ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? route:  
1. Minimum checks should be made within 5 working days of receipt of the 
information.  
                                                          
3 Statutory agents are permitted to proactively disclose this otherwise confidential information with the 
person deemed to be at risk without the fear of prosecution as a result of an exemption under the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. 
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2. A full risk assessment should be completed within 5 working days of the minimum 
checks being completed. 
3. Cases should then be referred to the local decision making forum. 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƉĂŶĐǇƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐĂssessed level of risk. However, if there is 
a concern of imminent harm to the person deemed to be at risk from the subject, then 
immediate action must be taken to safeguard them regardless of route (Home Office, 2016: 
17). Making previously restricted information available to members of the public as part of 
efforts to reduce victimisation may initially seem positive and empowering. However, the 
specific targeting of this policy towards people experiencing domestic violence and abuse  W 
as opposed to any other type of victimisation  W raises several concerns which in turn may 
render its implementation problematic.  
Domestic violence and abuse includes a wide range of behaviours resulting in 
physical, emotional, psychological or sexual harm, and may also involve control over a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?An estimated one in four women will experience 
domestic violence and abuse during their lifetime; in the UK alone, an average of two 
women a week are killed by a current or former partner annually (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015). While the majority of domestic violence and abuse cases involve intimate 
partners, victimisation can also be committed by and towards family members. This is often 
overlooked in popular and political discourse, even though such experiences may have links 
to the intimate partner violence perpetrated or experienced later on in life (Holt et al., 
2008). The DVDS is a policy which aims to equip a person with new information which will 
allow them to take steps to ensure their safety. However, it was designed with intimate 
partners in mind, particularly those who were not necessarily familiar with one another 
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before meeting and entering into a relationship, so is therefore less appropriate to the types 
of victimisation which occur among family members.  
dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĞ  ‘ĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?was further evidence 
of her attempts to address the myriad ways in which a person may experience domestic 
violence and abuse (Bowcott, 2015). While seemingly progressive, research has 
demonstrated the complicated nature of this type of victimisation which often renders 
prevention, intervention and redress difficult (Hoyle and Sanders, 2000). The repeat and 
often hidden nature of domestic violence and abuse has recently led researchers to 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ‘ĐƌŝŵĞĚƌŽƉ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
numbers of domestic violence cases recorded by the Crime Survey of England and Wales 
(Walby et al., 2016). The inherent dynamic of the intimate relationship between the parties 
involved means victims may not be aware that the behaviours they are experiencing are 
abusive; suggestions of a separation or avoidance of contact may  be difficult or even 
undesirable; and there may be feelings of fear, hope or resignation impeding a victim to 
leave the abusive party (Dobash and Dobash, 1984; Kelly, 1988). In some cases, victims of 
domestic abuse want the violence to stop but not necessarily their relationship with the 
violent person (Zink et al, 2003; Fitzgibbon and Walklate, 2016). All of these factors result in 
only a small proportion of cases coming to the attention of the police, or indeed anyone 
outside of the abusive relationship, while further demonstrating the nuanced differences of 
domestic violence specifically (Hoyle, 1998; Hoyle and Sanders, 2000). Therefore, proactive 
prevention initiatives are both necessary and to be encouraged so long as they are 
ultimately positive and do not feed in to traditional victim blaming stereotypes where 
culpability is affiliated to the victimised person. 
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Drawing on empirical research with key stakeholders, this paper demonstrates how 
perceived successes relating to one particular domestic violence prevention policy, the 
DVDS, must be qualified by the different experiences, risk levels and methods of 
engagement relating to those seeking information via the scheme. Difficulties in interpreting 
available data (relating to applications, applicants and outcomes) include reporting 
processes which fail to differentiate between ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? routes. 
The analysis evaluates how the  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞDVDS situates responsibility 
with potential domestic violence victims to take actions which may put them at greater risk 
of harm of incurring such victimisation. This links to existing debates about the symbolic 
mobilisation of victims for political gain, therefore the discussion invokes a critical 
victimological framework of analysis to assess the co-opting of domestic violence victims 
through ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?route and the potential implications this has for meaningful 
violence prevention initiatives.  
Background to the study 
Since becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May has continued to pledge support in tackling 
domestic violence. Most recently, this has involved putting forth the Domestic Violence and 
Abuse Bill which seeks to consolidate existing legislation and introduce new measures to 
help victims navigate the criminal justice system better. At present, there is no specific 
'crime' of domestic violence in England and Wales; instead, several civil and criminal 
measures have been implemented to address this form of victimisation in addition to 
legislation covering offences such as verbal, physical and sexual assault. The Family Law Act 
1996, as amended by the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004, enables applicants 
to obtain injunctions through the courts. These include Non-Molestation Orders and 
Occupation Orders, which place certain requirements on an abuser to either desist in 
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particular actions (such as contacting the applicant) or compels them to act in a certain way 
(such as to seek alternative accommodation) (Home Office, 2013a).  Failure to comply with 
Non-Molestation Orders became subject to criminal penalty, however the often prohibitive 
victim requirements and caveats underpinning Non-Molestation and Occupation Orders, 
such as costs involved and having to attend court, means they are becoming increasingly 
less accessible to those in most need.  
Similar concerns have been raised about the impact of criminal sanctions, which are 
taken up by the Crown Prosecution Service on behalf of the victim irrespective of how 
willing they are to pursue this course of action. Recent expansions of criminal sanctions 
include the introduction of the Domestic Violence Protection Notice and Domestic Violence 
Protection Order (Burton, 2015). These are similar to the civil remedies cited above, but are 
granted by the police and magistrates. A Domestic Violence Protection Notice is used when 
no further action is to be taken by the police, or when the perpetrator agrees to a caution or 
is bailed without conditions (Home Office, 2011). The Notice prevents the perpetrator from 
molesting the person protected by the Notice for up to 48 hours while a hearing in a 
magistrates' or specialist domestic violence court is sought by the police for a Domestic 
Violence Protection Order (a requirement upon issuing the Notice). Under the Notice, the 
perpetrator may also be ousted from the family home (either leave or not enter the 
premises, or does not come within a certain distance of the premises) for up to 48 hours. 
They may also be prohibited from evicting or excluding a protected person from the 
premises (Crime and Security Act 2010, section 25). While responsive in the immediate 
sense, such measures are not designed to be long-term solutions to domestic violence; 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇŽĨĨĞƌ ‘ďƌĞĂƚŚŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂďƵƐĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞǁŚĂƚ ?ŝĨĂŶǇ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ
take next.  
8 
 
The options available to a person experiencing, or at risk of experiencing, domestic 
violence are usually dependent on their level of risk. Therefore, tools to more effectively 
assess risk in cases of actual or potential domestic violence have been created. These 
include the Domestic Abuse, Stalking, Harassment and Honour Based Violence (DASH) test; 
this is undertaken by the police and partner agencies (such as domestic abuse service 
providers) as part of a rapid response to domestic abuse (Richards, 2009; SafeLives, 2014). It 
involves asking a series of questions, the answers to which indicate the nature, level and 
immediacy of harm faced by the victim which in turn determines their risk level as 
 ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? ? ‘ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ?Žƌ ‘ŚŝŐŚ ? ?/ĨƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂƌĞƌĂŝƐĞĚĂďŽƵƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƌŝƐŬ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůů
usually be referred to a Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) where relevant 
information will be shared between the local police as well as (where relevant) 
representatives from probation, health, child protection, housing, and domestic violence 
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ?dŚĞƐĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐǁŝůůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?
establishing a co-ordinated safeguarding action plan which is then implemented among the 
relevant agencies.  
The Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme is aimed at early intervention; it emerged 
following a highly-publicised campaign which focused heavily on the murder of domestic 
violence victim Clare Wood, who was killed by her ex-partner George Appleton in 2009 (The 
Telegraph 2012). They had met online in 2007 and dated for about 18 months, during which 
time George had been abusive towards Clare on several occasions. She ended the 
relationship on account of his serial unfaithfulness whereupon  W as is common in domestic 
violence murders  W his violence towards her escalated. Despite contacting Greater 
Manchester Police at least five times alleging criminal damage, harassment, threats to kill 
and sexual assault (IPCC, 2010), the potential danger to Clare, evidenced by his previous 
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convictions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and a custodial sentence for 
one particularly brutal assault on a former partner, was not adequately addressed. Two 
weeks after her last contact with the police in January 2009, George strangled Clare, setting 
her body alight before taking his own life soon afterwards.  
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation into how 
Greater Manchester Police had dealt with ůĂƌĞ ?Ɛcase found that although there had been 
significant failings, her death was not directly attributable to any of these (IPCC, 2016). 
Noting the facts of the case, Coroner Jennifer Leeming suggested in her report that a 
disclosure process ought to be established so that people could find out whether or not a 
person they were in a relationship with had a history of violence towards previous partners. 
Her recommendation was subsequently cited in the DVDS policy document produced by the 
Home Office (2013: 2):   
subject to appropriate risk assessment and safeguard, I recommend that 
consideration should be given to the disclosure of such convictions and their 
circumstances to potential victims in order that they can make informed choices 
about matters affecting their safety and that of their children.  
In the same year Clare was murdered, Chief Constable Brian Moore of Wiltshire Police, on 
behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, published his report  ‘Tackling Perpetrators 
of Violence against Women and Girls ? which suggested that partners should have greater 
access to information about violent offenders as part of enhanced safeguarding measures: 
A national review of serial perpetrators of domestic abuse estimated that around 
25,000 offenders of domestic violence had abused two or more different victims 
with violence or threats of violence in a three year period. Of those 2,500 had 
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abused three or more victims and one force had an offender who had committed 
violence against eight different victims.  (ACPO, 2009) 
A 10-week consultation process took place between October 2011 and January 2012 where 
members of the public were invited to provide their views on the proposed Domestic 
Violence Disclosure Scheme. Among the 259 responses received were those from Refuge 
and tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝĚ, two leading UK domestic abuse organisations who opposed the policy on 
the grounds of perceived inefficiency and the absence of significant resources which would 
be needed to meet the enhanced demands placed on both the police and domestic abuse 
organisations (Home Office, 2012).  
Regardless of these concerns, the DVDS was launched as a fourteen-month pilot 
project in four police force areas  W Greater Manchester, Gwent, Wiltshire, and 
Nottinghamshire during 2012-13.  In considering the potential impact of this pilot, the Home 
Office had indicated that the estimated police officer and Independent Domestic Violence 
Adviser (IDVA) 4 time required to deal with 500 cases per year under the public-initiated 
 ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ƌŽƵƚĞwould cost £0.39m per year (Home Office, 2011). The expected annual 
reduction of domestic violence by 0.2% as a result of this practice would in turn save £260m 
per year. Similarly, under the statutory-initiated  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?route the £1.57m estimated 
costs of dealing with 1,000 cases per year was set against a £650m saving through reducing 
domestic abuse by 0.5% annually. Given the 2009 report by Silvia Walby that the annual cost 
of domestic violence to the criminal justice system specifically was estimated to be around 
£1.3billion annually, there appeared to be clear economic benefits to implementing the 
                                                          
4 IDVAs are professionally trained, specialist domestic violence support workers who offer intensive, 




policy. However, when it came to assessing the actual costs and impact of the policy 
following the pilot, it was discovered that these estimates had been far too low; the revised 
combined number of 4,302 cases dealt with through the policy annually would instead cost 
around £27.4million to implement owing to a greater-than-envisaged uptake of the scheme 
(Home Office, 2013).   
Following its national implementation, the Home Office published another report 
detailing their assessment of s^ ?Ɛfirst year (Home Office, 2016). This was compiled using 
information provided by all 43 police forces and from workshops undertaken with 29 
practitioners (25 police officers and 4 domestic violence workers) involved with 
implementing the DVDS. The study was careful to indicate that it was 'not designed to 
consider any impact DVDS may have had on domestic violence and abuse victims or 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞ “ǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?, but rather to assess how it was operating and how it might 
be further developed (2016: 3). The report indicated that 4,724 applications were received 
and 1,938 disclosures were made for the period from 8 March to 31 December 2014 
inclusive (2016: 4). The thematic findings arising from the practitioner workshops indicated 
elements of 'good practice emerging' such as markers being placed on the Police National 
Computer (PNC) following a disclosure in order to 'alert other officers to an individual 
potentially at high risk of domestic violence or abuse' (2016: 4).  Enhancing frontline officers' 
knowledge and understanding of the DVDS was identified as a good way of promoting it to 
the public in a way that may increase their access to it (2016: 4). This somewhat superficial 
evaluation was light on detail and generally overlooked how the policy was operating for 
victims specifically. It remains the case that knowledge and insight into whether or not the 
policy is working to reduce domestic violence and abuse is largely absent, thus was a 




The study sought to find out how the DVDS was operating, first as an overview at a national 
level then more specifically at a local level. A qualitative, mixed methodology approach was 
employed, with the data collection period taking place between 2015 and 2016. All of the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐƵŶĚĞƌǁĞŶƚĞƚŚŝĐĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŚŽŵĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
(University of Kent) before the data collection commenced. First, Freedom of Information 
(FOI) requests were sent to all 43 police forces in England and Wales in April 2015, one year 
after the national implementation of the DVDS. The FOIs asked each police force for the 
following information: How many applications had been made under the DVDS since its 
national implementation in March 2014; How many applications had been granted (and the 
reasons for this); How many had been denied (and the reasons for this); How many 
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞŽŶĂ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?ďĂƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ, What 
demographic information had been obtained from applicants (adhering to anonymity). The 
requests outlined that in addition to the quantitative information available, information was 
being sought about the reasons and rationales given both for granting and denying such 
applications to give a fuller picture about how the DVDS was being operationalised across 
the nation. Thirty-nine police forces complied with the FOI request; the four which refused 
to do so exempted themselves citing prohibitive costs to the force through hours that would 
be spent obtaining the information.5 Of those who responded, there was a variance in the 
level of detail provided, to the point where in some cases additional email and telephone 
communication took place between the researcher and police officers to clarify the nature 
of the request, the information being provided, or to provide supplementary information 
related to the request. The FOI data was thematically analysed to gain an insight into how 
                                                          
5 At the time of undertaking this study, the researcher was unaware that challenges to such refusals were 
likely to eventually result in successful outcomes, therefore did not follow up on these.  
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the policy was operating in each area, what the national picture looked like, and what 
discrepancies were evident at this early point. The data was considered an incomplete 
snapshot, thus no comparisons between forces were made but rather the information used 
to inform the subsequent interviews.  
The second part of the study comprised of eight semi-structured interviews with 
selected people working with the DVDS in one specific policing area. This purposive sample 
of consisted of: two police officers and one police community support officer who were 
designated domestic violence  ‘single point of contact ? officers; three Independent Domestic 
Violence Advisers (IDVAs); one manager of a central domestic violence charitable 
organisation; and one retired police officer who facilitates a domestic violence perpetrator 
prevention programme. In order to protect the privacy of the individuals involved, only their 
pseudonyms and job roles are provided alongside relevant quotations. All potentially 
identifying features (such as locality, names of organisations or cases) have also been 
omitted or anonymised:  
Pseudonym  Role  Role Abbreviation 
Tanya  
 
Independent Domestic Violence Adviser IDVA 
Eleanor  
 
Independent Domestic Violence Adviser IDVA 





Police Officer and Domestic Violence 
Single Point of Contact 





Police Officer and Domestic Violence 
Single Point of Contact 
PO DV Spoc 
Kate   
 
Police Community Support Officer and 
Domestic Violence Single Point of Contact 
PSCO DV Spoc 
Amy  
 









Interviewees were identified and contacted directly by the researcher, who has links with 
key domestic violence agencies, organisations and practitioners in the selected policing 
area. Interview questions were tailored according to the role undertaken by the interviewee 
and ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞs^ ?
the perceived strengths and limitations of the policy, how it was seen to be operating in 
practice and what improvements might be made. Where relevant, interviewees were asked 
questions linked to the information returned from the FOIs to clarify, explain or expand 
upon the reasons given for or against disclosure decisions. All interviewees signed consent 
forms prior to commencing and were prŽǀŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĚĞƚĂŝůƐĂƚƚŚĞ
end. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes to 1.5 hours and were most often undertaken in 
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŽĨǁŽƌŬǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌǁĂƐalso permitted to observe their 
working environment. During the course of the data collection, the researcher took up 
invitations to observe decision-making forums where DVDS decisions were taking place, and 
to attend ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ‘drop-in ?ĞǀĞŶƚƐ where DVDS disclosures were 
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made. The researcher was not present during these disclosures, but was able to speak to 
some the people involved after this information had been shared. Although the people to 
whom a disclosure had been made were happy to talk informally about this process, they 
declined to be formally interviewed for the project. Nevertheless, the confidentiality of all 
those spoken to was maintained at throughout. The interviews were professionally 
transcribed then analysed thematically, first manually then through the Nvivo 11 software 
programme where coding took place.  
The emergence of victim hierarchies  
The findings demonstrate that victim hierarchies are evident in the operationalising of the 
DVDS, with Ă ‘ƚǁŽ-ƚŝĞƌ ?ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐemerging according to whether the person 
seeking information has come via the  ‘right to ask ? (RtA) or  ‘right to know ? (RtK) route. This 
was found to have a significant impact throughout the process: from knowing about the 
scheme through to decisions to apply, decisions to disclose, what information would be 
imparted and levels of statutory involvement following a disclosure. In all cases, the DVDS 
was working better for people accessing information through the RtK route with some 
significant impediments noted for RtA applicants. The different guidelines and resources 
available to deal with these two routes often underpinned this discrepancy, but concerns 
were noted among interviewees about the potentially negative impacts on victims and their 
level of risk. These discrepancies may be masked as a result of RtA and RtK data often being 
conflated with regards to applications, applicants and related outcomes. In exploring this, 
the findings presented below demonstrate problematic negotiations of risk and risk status 
which raises concerns about the efficacy of this policy to protect past, present and potential 
victims of domestic violence.  
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Discrepancies in recording practices 
The FOI responses indicated some confusion and conflation of data held on the RtA and RtK 
routes, with this impacting on the application and disclosure information obtained. 
Attempts to clarify this confusion through follow-up conversations with several people 
providing the FOI information indicated varying levels of understanding of the differences 
between the two routes with some confirming that the data provided about the number of 
DVDS 'applications' actually included cases relating to both RtA and RtK routes. This was also 
evident ŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽŵĞKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?where both routes were included in 
the 4,724 figurĞĨŽƌ ‘ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞZƚ<ƌŽƵƚĞ ?ŶŽ  ‘ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŵĂĚĞĂƐ
the disclosure is a proactive measure taken by the police. Therefore, this conflation renders 
it difficult to discern how effective this policy is specifically in terms of public awareness and 
autonomous engagement with it through the RtA route.  
In the first year of its national implementation, much media attention was given to 
the fact that high numbers of people had supposedly taken it upon themselves to apply to 
the police for information via the DVDS. The resultant press coverage routinely cited 
application figures alongside headlines such as: ůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>ĂǁŝƐ ?ƐĂǀŝŶŐůŝǀĞƐ ?ŽŶĞǇĞĂƌŽŶ 
(Cullen, 2015) and  ?ůĂƌĞ ?ƐůĂǁ ?ƐĂǀĞƐ ? ? ? ?ǁŽŵĞŶĨƌŽŵǀŝŽůĞŶƚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŝŶĨŝ ƚǇĞĂƌ 
(Grierson, 2015), inferring the success of the policy to reach the wider public and elicit 
engagement. These media reports do not differentiate between the two routes, nor indicate 
the need to do so. This erroneously suggests that the numbers and cases cited are all RtA 
applications which have been instigated by members of the public, when this is not 
necessarily the case. Not only is this misleading about the potential uptake of the policy, it 
also has a significant impact on the ability to evaluate the efficacy of the RtA route if this 
information is not being correctly captured and represented.  
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The DVDS guidance (Home Office, 2016) also requires that demographic data is 
captured in relation to the applicant and the subject. Several returning forces provided 
demographical data for their RtA applicants in the FOI responses. However, not every force 
appeared to be doing this as some could not provide all or part of this information. This 
incomplete picture makes it difficult to assess in terms of who is (and is not) engaging with 
the policy. This in turn makes it difficult to know where to target DVDS awareness 
campaigns with regards to people from sexual, ethnic, religious or other minority 
backgrounds. Furthermore, the DVDS guidance indicates that it is the appůŝĐĂŶƚ ?Ɛ 
demographical characteristics which should be recorded, therefore this is what was 
returned in the FOI information. As the applicant may not necessarily be the person at risk 
 ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ? ?ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƉĞƌƐ Ŷ ‘ ?ǁŚŽŝƐat risk), interpretations of 
this demographical information need to be treated with caution. Media reports which 
indicate a given number ŽĨ ‘ŵĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?who are engaging with the policy often fail to 
indicate that male applicants to the DVDS may be acting on ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?Ɛbehalf. Accurate 
recording in this respect is perhaps rendered more important as a result of the perceived 
gendered dynamic of the policy. Representatives from male domestic violence victim 
charities have critiqued the fact that the DVDS ŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘ůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ?in 
the media as some men may be dissuaded from engaging with it on their own or other 
ŵĂůĞƐ ?ďĞŚĂůǀĞƐ(Shropshire Star, 2015). During the research, interviewee Fiona also 
commented on the gendered nature of the terminology and the potentially exclusionary 
impact this could have on male victims:   
WŽƵůĚƚŚĞŵĞŶŬŶŽǁ ?ŐĂŝŶ ? ‘ůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ? ?ĚŽƚŚĞǇĂƵƚŽŵƚŝĐĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬ ‘ĨĞŵĂůĞ ?
ǁŝƚŚůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ?ƵƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ĚŽǁĞũƵƐƚƵƐĞ ‘s^ ?ĂůůƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?ŝƚ ?Ɛ
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easier to ƐĂǇůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ?tŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĂƚ ?tĞůůƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĐĂŶĨŝŶĚŽƵƚĂďŽƵƚǇŽƵƌ
partner. (Fiona, PO DV Spoc, original emphasis) 
What was of note in the FOI information received, however, is that males were 
predominantly the subject of the applications; none of the results received from the 39 
police areas explicitly identified cases where background checks on female subjects were 
sought. The apparent absence of DVDS applications about a female subject suggests that 
the policy is not being used by men or women to find out about their risk from female 
partners.   
A final point on recording practices relates to outcomes. Currently, if an application 
is successful and a disclosure is made, there is no stipulated requirement for the police to 
follow up with the RtA applicant afterwards. Therefore, the police will be unaware of what  W 
if any  W action was taken following the disclosure unless that person comes to the attention 
of the police at a later date. This means that media inferences that the DVDS ŝƐ ‘ƐĂǀŝŶŐůŝǀĞƐ ?
are based solely on the assumption that a person who has received a disclosure has gone on 
to leave their partner and avoided any further interpersonal harm. At present, there is no 
evidence support (or refute) this claim, but it is speculative at best. If the DVDS is to be 
lauded by politicians and the media as being a  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŝŶ ‘ƐĂǀŝŶŐůŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽ
be an adequate manner of recording data to support or refute this claim. It would also be 
useful for those working and researching around domestic violence to know what (if any) 
action an applicant took following receipt of the disclosure information in order to know 
what (if any) impact this policy is having on RtA recipients. In addition, the information 
would assist in determining the poliĐǇ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŚĂƌŵĂƐ leaving a violent 
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partner may put a person at greater risk of incurring violence, as was ultimately the case for 
Clare Wood.  
Routes to obtaining a DVDS disclosure 
In lieu of speaking to the wider public about their knowledge of this policy, questions were 
asked of interviewees about their perceptions of societal awareness. Despite being available 
since 2014, there was agreement among all of the interview participants that the DVDS was 
not as well known among the general public as it could be: 
/ƐƚŝůůĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>ĂǁŝƐƚŚĂƚǁŝĚĞůǇŬŶŽǁŶ ?ŝƐŝƚ ?ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƉƵďůŝĐƐŽ/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŚĂƐŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇŐŽƚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƐĐŚĞŵĞ
there that you can kind of request information. (Kate, PSCO DV Spoc) 
WĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĂƐĂǁĂƌĞŽĨŝƚĂƐ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚďĞ ?DŽƐƚŽĨŵǇĐůŝĞŶƚƐ
when I talk to them  W ǁŚĞŶ/ ?ŵĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐĂůů Wsome of them know what it is 
ďƵƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ƐŽ/ĚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽspend a lot of time explaining what it is. 
(Eleanor, IDVA)  
Discussions about access to the DVDS led to a key finding: the positive impact that 
Independent Domestic Violence Advisers (IDVAs) can have with regards to DVDS awareness, 
involvement, engagement and advocacy. This constituted a key difference between the RtA 
and RtK routes as what emerged was something of a grey area between the two dependent 
on perceptions of risk.  
A domestic violence victim whose situation has come to the attention of the police 
and who been assessed as high risk under the DASH test will be referred to an IDVA to 




advocate while the criminal justice process (such as an investigation or application for Non-
Molestation Order, Domestic Violence Prevention Order etc.) is underway. Similarly, as 
IDVAs work with so many clients, they may come to know of repeat or serial domestic 
violence perpetrators. During the client safeguarding process, the IDVA can indicate that the 
DVDS is available and support an application to it, whether or not the IDVA is aware of any 
information held on the subject. In this sense, there is a grey area between the RtA and the 
RtK as the request technically comes from the client (perhaps having been informed of the 
policy by the IDVA) but the process from there on in follows the (swifter) RtK model as the 
risk and safeguarding concerns are determined to be high. However, the determination of 
risk status was not always straightforward and could end up having an adverse impact on 
ƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?ĂƐTanya outlined: 
ƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚĞDZ/sƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞƚĞĂŵƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?ǁĞũƵƐƚ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬĐůŝĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂƌĞǁĂƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽƌŵĞĚŝƵŵƌŝƐŬĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ?
dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůŽƚŽĨĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽƌŵĞĚŝƵŵƌŝƐŬ, which I 
ŚĂƚĞƵƐŝŶŐ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? ? ‘ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ? ? ‘ŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂƐĨĂƌĂƐ/ ?ŵĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂ
situation risk is so fluid; one minute they could be standard risk and overnight they 
ĐŽƵůĚďĞŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŝŵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĂƚƚƌĂnsition. 
(Tanya, IDVA)   
The process works ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇĨŽƌ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ? applicants, who will have 
to have known about the DVDS in order to initiate a request. They are ordinarily considered 
to be standard (low) risk unless they mention something ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ
during the application process which indicates otherwise. These applications will be 
processed via a decision making forum such as the Public Protection Unit. While an IDVA 
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may form part of this decision-making panel, they are unlikely to have had any contact with 
the RtA applicant or know much about them apart from the information provided as part of 
their DVDS request. If a disclosure is to be made, this is done by a police officer, ideally with 
an IDVA present (not necessarily the same IDVA from the panel) as the DVDS guidance 
suggests that is 'good practice to consider a joint-agency approach to the disclosure 
provision' (Home Office 2013: 25). The disclosure meeting will usually be the first time that 
the applicant (or person in need of safeguarding ŝĨƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚǁĂƐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ?) will have 
been provided with direct access to a domestic violence specialist; in that time any domestic 
abuse-specific information or advice they required will have to have been self-initiated and 
sourced elsewhere. If no disclosure is made, then the RtA applicant is unlikely to meet with 
an IDVA or have any further statutory resources provided to them. Therefore, individuals 
who come apply under the RtA route will only engage with an IDVA at the end of the 
process during the disclosure (if one is forthcoming) unless their risk level increases in the 
interim period.  
The analysis also highlighted differences between RtA and RtK routes in relation to 
the criteria for obtaining the disclosure information. High risk IDVA clients were more likely 
to receive requested information held on a subject (via the RtK route) as this was considered 
crucial to their safeguarding and may have been advocated for accordingly by their IDVA at 
the decision making forum. At the time of receiving this information, these clients were 
likely to be separated (temporarily or otherwise) from their partner as a result of their being 
arrested and in police custody, or on remand, or having had sanctions placed on their 
proximity to the victim to ensure her safety. For these clients, this separated status is not an 
impediment to receiving the DVDS disclosure and the information may be imparted in a 
timely fashion as a result of the pressing safeguarding issue. For RtA applicants on the other 
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hand, the process is significantly different. If they decide to separate from their partner  W 
perhaps due to an escalation in violent behaviour  W while their application is being 
considered, then they forfeit the right to any information that would have been provided to 
them via a disclosure. This is because the DVDS guidance states that the RtA applicant must 
be in a relationship with the subject at the time of the application and at the time of 
disclosure to ensure that a balance is struck betwĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĂŶĚ
considerationƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?This stipulation was borne out in the FOI 
responses received. One police force indicated that out of 166 DVDS applications (during the 
first year of implementation), 67 had been declined for a reason outlined in the guidance 
with over half (39) being due to the applicant having separated from the subject. 
Furthermore, tŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐǁĞƌĞĐŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞĂƐ ‘ƌŝƐŬƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĚƵĞƚŽďĞŝŶŐ
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚ ? ?While procedurally this may be correct, it could instead be the case that the 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƌŝƐŬŚĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĚƵƚǇŽĨĐĂƌĞĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŽ
the RtK client is not replicated with the RtA applicant.  
Assuming the RtA applicant complies with the DVDS criteria, their lesser risk status 
means they may have to wait up to 30 days for a decision making forum to review their 
request. By comparison, an IDVA client who makes a DVDS request may have this reviewed 
at a multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) much quicker as a result of their 
higher risk status and the subsequent invocation of a RtK disclosure process. This 
discrepancy in timeframes was commented upon by several of the interviewees: 
YŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŚĞůƉĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ[the RtA disclosure] could be a lot more immediate. 
(Tony, PO DV Spoc)   
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YŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁĂŶĚǇŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁŶŽǁ ?/ƚ ?ƐŶŽŐŽŽĚ: oh yes, you can be told in 
ĂǁĞĞŬ ?ƐƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶǁĞĐĂŶĂůůŐĞƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĚĚŽŝƚ. (Fiona, PO DV Spoc, original 
emphasis) 
 As soon as the MARAC has agreed we can give [the client] the disclosure that day if 
she can make it whereas with the... when you apply to the police [via RtA] ŝƚ ?ƐĂ
slightly lengthier process. (Tanya, IDVA) 
Tanya went on to voice her concerns about what could happen in the time a RtA applicant 
was left with no specialist support or intervention: 
I understand about data protection and everything, you know, but at the end of the 
day we have to weigh up safety and if it will reduce or stop one death then ... you 
know, the process has got to be cut down in terms of [time] because  ?you are going 
to lose ƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƐŝǆǁĞĞŬƐ ?ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚǇŽƵ ?  zŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐĂǇ ? “KŚ/
ĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞďŽƚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽǁĂŝƚƐŝǆǁĞĞŬƐ ?KŚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?KŚŚĞ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐŶŝĐĞƚŽ 
ŵĞƚŚŝƐǁĞĞŬ ?/ǁŽŶ ?ƚďŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂ  ?ƐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? (Tanya, IDVA) 
This too was borne out by the FOI information received, with most forces indicating a 
notable level of applicant withdrawal from the process during the six week period. At 
present, no information is held as to why RtA applications are withdrawn or whether this 
has a negative impact on the risk level of the applicant.    
Determining the disclosure information  
The nature and amount of information which could be disclosed was a key theme which 
came up for all interviewees, some indicating examples of good practice while others 
demonstrated the futility of the DVDS in particular cases. A key difference was 
representation, or lack thereof. IDVAs who attend the MARAC wh
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application is being processed can advocate on their behalf from the perspective of having 
built up a relationship with them and therefore knowing what information would prove 
useful to their client:  
We [the DZƉĂŶĞů ?ĂůůĂŐƌĞĞĂƐĂĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƐĂŝĚ. 
ŶĚŝĨƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŵĂǇďĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞŚĂǀĞ
said or they could give a little bit more information I will ask for that at the MARAC 
so that wŚĞŶǁĞůĞĂǀĞǁĞ ?ƌĞŚĂƉƉǇƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐĞĚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƚhat can be 
disclosed about him. (Tanya, IDVA, original emphasis)  
Clients that I support through the process, I usually speak to them about information 
ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞmeeting that can be given to them if they want it.  I find that 
more helpful for those clients than [the RtA applicants] who have gone through the 
ƉŽůŝĐĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞDZƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
can be shared because we can agree it rather than just the police giving out. 
(Eleanor, IDVA)  
As the IDVA is working with the client, they will be aware of any issues which may impede 
their understanding of the disclosure information, or will prove more or less relevant to the 
victim ?ƐŽǁŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?dherefore, the IDVA is able to address matters related to their 
ĐůŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ disclosure such as the language used, the nature and amount of information 
imparted, and when the disclosure should be made (especially if their client has a history of 
substance abuse or mental health impairments). For RtA applicants on the other hand, this 
level of advocacy and representation is absent unless someone at the meeting is aware of 
the individual and their needs, or these have been noted during the application process. In 
such cases, the disclosure information imparted may be a lot less detailed: 
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I think the amount of information that we give people as well could be more 
thorough. (Tony, PO DV Spoc) 
 ?dŚĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ? so very basic sometimes. (Fiona, PO DV Spoc) 
 /ƚ ?Ɛ ? “,Ğ ?ƐŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƚŽĨĂŵŝůǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?&ƵůůƐƚŽƉ ? (Alice, IDVA) 
 
 
RtA disclosures which are minimal, vague or uninformative may result in the applicant re-
evaluating the seriousness of their concerns and deciding to remain in the relationship 
where they could be subject to further abuse and victimisation. If there is subsequent police 
involvement and their risk is reassessed as high, they will likely be referred to an IDVA. 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂtive potential is questionable for RtA applicants. This was 
highlighted by interviewees as indicating a significant discrepancy in the two disclosure 
routes and possibly ĨĂŝůŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂƐƉĞƌƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐĂŝŵƐ: 
KŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐǁŚĞƌĞǁĞ ?ǀĞŚĂd people that have applied themselves [via RtA] 
and then come into us later on into our service [as high risk clients] ǁĞ ?ǀĞ ?ŝƚ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞ
ĐůĞĂƌƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƌŝƚŚĂƐŶ ?ƚ
ďĞĞŶĂDZƚŚĞŶƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƋƵite rigid  ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚgot 
someone advocating for them ĂŶĚƐĂǇŝŶŐ ? “tĞůůĂĐƚƵĂůůǇǁĞĐĂŶĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ? ?
ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůǇǁŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ? may fall down. (Tanya, IDVA)  
 If [RtA applicants] go to the police station and say they want a personal disclosure 
ƚŚĞǇƵƐƵĂůůǇũƵƐƚŐĞƚĂůŝŶĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĚ[the police] have 
to do that with an IDVA, ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ/ ?ǀĞŶŽƚŝĐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
information they get from MARAC than through [the RtA application route]. 
(Eleanor, IDVA)   
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The ramifications of this distinction became clear later on when discussing elevations in risk 
levels among domestic violence victims: 
/ ?ǀĞŚĂĚĐůŝĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŐŽƚĂůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬĂĨƚĞƌ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>ĂǁƐŽƚŚĞŶǁŚĞŶǁĞƐĂǇĂďŽƵƚĂs^ƚŚĞǇƐĂǇ ? “KŚǁĞůů
/ ?ǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂĚĂůĂƌĞ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ? ?ŶĚ/ƐŽƌƚŽĨĞǆƉůŽƌĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞen told and ... 
instead of like so-and-ƐŽ ?ƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶǀŝĐƚĞĚŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
female it would be ŚĞ ?ƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶǀŝĐƚĞĚŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞŝƚƐƚŽƉƐ ? (Tanya, 
IDVA)   
/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?comments about what is allowed to be imparted during the disclosure 
indicated a level of frustration with regards to the perceived limitations of the policy. 
Referring to the cyclical nature of domestic abuse victimisation and repeat perpetrators, 
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůĐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨĂƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛoffending history as being more substantive 
than they were allowed to share:  
You could have ŽŚǇĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶĐŽŶǀŝĐƚed of a violent offence in 2010 [but what 
about] tŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŶŝĐŬĞĚ ? ?ƚŝŵĞƐŝŶ-between for assaulting females 
ďƵƚŚĞŶĞǀĞƌǁĞŶƚĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂĨĞŵĂůĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ [prosecution] or there 
ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĞŶŽƵŐŚĞvidence [to prosecute]. (Alice, IDVA) 
The DVDS guidance states the range of information which can be relayed to 
applicants/clients through a disclosure. Although this is not limited to convictions, in order 
to not fall foul of the threshold set by the Data Protection Act 1998, many interviewees 
suspected that statutory agents were likely to err on the side of caution and limit the 
amount of information they provided about the subject beyond convictions. However, as so 
few domestic violence incidents come to the attention of the police, let alone result in a 
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conviction, this supplementary information relating to histories of violence was seen by 
some to be just as useful to potential victims: 
WŚĂƚǁĞƚƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞŝŶŽƵƌs^ ?ƐŶŽǁŝƐŚŽǁŵĂŶǇƚŝŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ?been 
ĂƚDZĂƐǁĞůůǁŝƚŚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐůŝĞŶƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇƵƐĞĨƵůďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŵĂǇ
ďĞƚŚĂƚĂĐůŝĞŶƚǁŚŽǁĞŶƚƚŽDZ ?ũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ?ƐŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶ
police are going to have [secured a prosecution]... if they know that their 
ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĞƚŝŵĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŽƚŚĞŵŝƐƋƵŝƚĞƵƐĞĨƵů ? (Tanya, 
IDVA) 
Protocol following the disclosure  
In cases where there is no information held on the subject by the police, then this is 
communicated to the RtA applicant accordingly with the caveat that no information being 
held does not necessarily mean that the applicant ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐ are unfounded, and therefore they 
are to be vigilant  ?ŝĨƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ? ?ŽƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ for any change in the situation (if 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘ ? ? ?If relevant information on the subject is held, and a disclosure is to be given, 
then under both the RtA and the RtK routes the person to whom the disclosure is made 
must first sign an undertaking that they understand the information to be confidential and 
they will not share it with anyone else, even the subject. This is underpinned by a warning 
that legal proceedings could result if this confidentiality is breached, effectively binding the 
person under the Data Protection Act 1998. Although legally necessary, this process raises 
several areas for concern among interviewees around the potential for further trauma or 
isolation through a person not being able to discuss their options with a trusted confidante:  
/ĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŵŝŐŚƚƉƵƚƚŚĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨĨďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĂďůĞ
to tell someone; their mum or just anyone that they can share that information with.  
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tŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞďĞŝŶŐƚŽůĚďǇĂƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ? “zŽƵĐĂŶŶŽƚƐŚĂƌĞƚŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƚƌŽƵďůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ǇĞĂŚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ? ? ?/ŵĞĂŶŝƚŚĂƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞƌ
ƐƚŽƉƉĞĚĂŶǇŽŶĞĨƌŽŵƐĂǇŝŶŐ ? “zĞĂŚ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?ďƵƚŝƚ ?Ɛ
definitely a barrier  ? ? ?/ƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŝƐŽůĂƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚ 
share it, you know, so it is difficult. (Amy, DVO Manager) 
 Having that clause on you would, I imagine, really burden the person because now 
[their fears have] been confirmed  ?and they would want to share it so it just seems 
ĂůŝƚƚůĞďŝƚ ? ? ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂůŵŽƐƚĂ ? ? ?/ǁŽŶ ƚƐĂǇƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞnt stick, but... (Paul, 
DVPP Facilitator) 
I can imagine it would be quite stressful for the victim not to be able to discuss 
things because obviously that is peoƉůĞ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨĐŽƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? (Tony, PO DV 
Spoc) 
However, some interviewees recognised the inherent difficulty in policing or detecting non-
compliance with such a regulation: 
ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵ not tell anybody else, can you? (Alice, 
IDVA) 
KŶĐĞǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐǇŽƵƐĂǇŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƚŽďĞƉĂƐƐĞĚŽŶ ?ŚŽǁ
can you ultimately control that?  Or how will you ever know? (Kate, PSCO DV Spoc) 
While the wider sharing of information was something that was recognised as likely beyond 
ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŵŽƌĞƚƌŽƵďůŝŶŐĨŽƌƐŽŵe was that ramifications of the disclosure 
information on the recipient. Speaking specifically about the RtA applicants, Tanya indicated 
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that the types of behaviours being experienced would not necessarily desist upon the 
culmination of the relationship:   
You could have somebody, say, for example me going to the police asking for a 
disclosure on a new partner  ?what do I do with that information?  ...  Well I try and 
ĨŝŶŝƐŚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďƵƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĞ ?ƐďĞĞŶĚŽŶĞĨŽƌƐƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂƐǁĞůůƐŽŚŽǁĚŽ/
finish that relationship?  How is it safe?  Because people that have never 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞďĞĨŽƌĞŽƌĞǀĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞ ?ŝƚ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇŚĂƌĚƚŽ
know what to dŽǁŚĞŶƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƚĂůŬŝŶŐǇŽƵ ? (Tanya, IDVA)   
As per the DVDS guidance, RtA applicants are given the contact details of local domestic 
violence organisations and advised of a safety plan by the disclosing police officer and 
accompanying IDVA, but as indicated above they are not permitted to discuss what they 
have been told with anyone else unless they have the express permission from the police to 
do so. The inability to speak about the situation could present problems when accessing 
further advice and support, especially from external domestic violence specialists. Amy, who 
works in a third sector domestic violence organisation, raised this issue when indicating how 
she and her colleagues would go about engaging with someone who has come to them to 
seek help, but who are bound by the DPA 1998 to not share what they have been told: 
tĞ ?ĚĨŝŶĚĂǁĂǇ ƌŽƵŶĚŝƚ ?ǁĞ ?ĚĨŝŶĚƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽƚĂůŬƚŽ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĞŶŽƵŐŚ
people here [at their organisation] who are trained. (Amy, DVO Manager) 
Disclosures made to IDVA clients via the RtK route, on the other hand, involve victims who 
are already assigned to specialists so are free to discuss this information with them as this 





As is often the case with victim-focused policies, a notable cause célèbre has usually been 
instrumental in establishing the initiative and is used to highlight its remit; from the 1993 
murder of Stephen Lawrence informing UK hate crime laws through to the murder of Sarah 
Payne in 2000 informing the creation of sex offender registers. Much of the subsequent 
political rhetoric suggests that the tragic events of the affiliated case should be the basis for 
lessons to be learnt about how to proceed in order to prevent similar outcomes in the 
future. At first glance, the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme follows this pattern in 
many ways, but upon closer inspection it would appear that this policy may exacerbate 
tragedy as a result of the victim hierarchies evident within it. In addition, a closer inspection 
of the DVDS highlights several contradictory elements in relation to victim-focused policy 
making which warrant examination and are considered in greater detail below. 
The DVDS is predicated on preventing future victimisation (the abuse of the new 
partner) through a reliance on the commission of a previous crime and existing victim, thus 
in order for future criminality to be prevented it must have been committed (and recorded) 
for the necessary information to exist. Therefore the themes of responsibility and good 
citizenship which underpin elements of this policy are largely focused towards the victim. 
The onus is placed on past, present or potential victims to do something about the situation 
they believe themselves to be in; from reporting instances of violence through to instigating 
an application and taking subsequent action. If the outcome is a disclosure, they are put in a 
position to do something with the information, even if this is to do nothing. On the other 
hand, if no disclosure is forthcoming  W either there is no information to disclose, or a 
decision has been taken not to disclose the information requested  W they must still decide 
what to do about their relationship and the concerns they have about their partner. Given 
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that the specific nature of domestic violence and abuse may involve volatility between 
partners, periods of separation and potential interdependency, it is important that 
interventions recognise the myriad factors which may impede effective interaction with 
those seeking information via the DVDS.  
It is presumed that a disclosure would necessarily lead to a person exiting a 
potentially abusive relationship if made aware of a paƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇǀŝŽůĞŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?zĞƚ
decisions to discontinue the relationship may be viewed by some as constituting partial 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĂŶǇƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶƚĂďƵƐĞĚĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?tŚŝůĞ
taking steps to enquire about a persoŶ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐǁŝůůŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇďĞƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŽŶ
ƐŽŵĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŽƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ?ƉƌŽŽĨŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐĂďƵƐŝǀĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ
may compound fears but may not do much to enable leaving the relationship if emotional 
or economic factors, family commitments, having nowhere else to go or being afraid of 
repercussions also feature. If diminishing resources for third sector organisations means 
support, advice, alternative accommodation and other necessary services are not available 
for a victim to exit then they may be left with little choice but to stay with their abuser. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the DVDS would have proved ineffectual in the specific case 
with which it is affiliated as Clare was murdered after separating from her partner, proving 
that the demise of the relationship does not necessarily mean a desistance in violence. 
Therefore, polices such as the DVDS which advocate preventative ideologies must be 
mindful of the wealth of feminist research which has demonstrated that leaving an abusive 
relationship may put the victim at greater risk of fatal violence from the perpetrator (Wilson 
and Daly, 1993; Fleury et al., 2000).  
32 
 
Over the past decade research has indicated that identifying and responding to 
ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƐŽĐŝĂůƐƵƉŽƌƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞŽĨĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ
domestic violence prevention (Bennett & Goodman, 2004). However, a shift towards victim-
centred resources and victim-focused policy and practice would require a complete 
overhaul to ensure that the criminal justice system truly has the wants and needs of the 
victim at heart. Instead, policies have been produced which, at best, seek to increase 
ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƌŽůĞĂŶĚŝŶƉƵƚďƵƚƐƚŽƉƐŚŽƌƚŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐnecessary rights or true 
empowerment. Policies dealing with domestic violence have implemented changes which 
have appear to place victims in a different category altogether: as managers of their own 
risk reduction.  
A more critical stance would suggest that the benefits of this policy lie with the 
politicians endorsing it rather than the general public at whom it is directed. As Garland 
(2001) discussed in his evaluation of shifts in penal policy, victims were  ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
system along with the ideologies of Conservative governments at a time when law and 
order policies were seeking to advance more punitive approaches in the criminal justice 
system, alongside enhancing individualised responses to crime prevention (Hall et al, 1978). 
Victims soon became co-opted into this rhetoric in a manner which returned to and 
entrenĐŚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ďĂĚ ?ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƉolicy-makers capitalising on disproportionate 
fears of crime to garner support for increased criminalisation and harsher punishments. 
Kearon and Godfrey (2007: 31) highlight how the combination of the symbolic, pure crime 
victim emerging during a period of increasingly punitive populism gave greater socio-
political salience to politicians aŶĚŵĞĚŝĂŽƵƚůĞƚƐǁŚŽƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ǀŽŝĐĞƐ ?
albeit specifically those which emulated the burgeoning rhetoric around fear (of crime). 
Politically useful victims were those constructed in a manner synonymous with passivity and 
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disempowerment through their encountering of suffering. Therefore, the attractiveness of a 
policy such as the DVDS which plays on the fears of the applicant is evident, as is the current 
governmental focus on documenting the numbers of applications and disclosures but not 
the outcomes of these applications and disclosures.  
Concluding thoughts  
The DVDS could be seen as a morally and ethically troubling policy in that it implies that 
anyone in an intimate relationship is vulnerable to victimisation. Nonetheless, the rapidly 
changing nature of interpersonal interaction and growth in online communication in 
contemporary societies may mean that information-sharing mechanisms such as the DVDS 
could be considered as modernised ways to seek out knowledge. The empirical research 
presented in this paper has demonstrated that the DVDS is currently operating very 
differently according to the status of the person requesting information. It appears to be the 
case that this is more easily and usefully accessed in cases involving high risk victims who 
are already assigned to IDVAs. Importantly, this advocacy is crucial to being able to navigate 
the often complicated criminal justice system. Access to the DVDS appears to be more 
difficult for those who seek information via tŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ƌŽƵƚĞ ?ƉůƵƐƚŚĞǇŵƵƐƚǁĂŝƚ
longer, may not receive the information needed, and are less likely to have the necessary 
support following a disclosure to manage the information imparted.  
While it is important that high risk victims are adequately provided for, a gap in 
provision currently exists for those who apply under the RtA route who may find their risk 
level elevates as a result of receiving information. As the criminal justice system becomes 
increasingly bureaucratised, parity in victim advocacy is necessary to offset concerns about 
low engagement, reduce the impact of deflecting responsibility to seek and manage 
previously restricted information, and ensure that engagement with the statutory sector 
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does not result in further trauma (Duggan and Heap, 2014). If the policy is to be promoted 
to elicit wider engagement, then a ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐŽĨ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬ ?ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ
from the point of contact through to aftercare following the outcome of the disclosure is 
necessary to ensure that risk levels do not elevate as a result of ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛinvolvement with 
this scheme. It is also important that the responsibility for such follow-up care does not shift 
towards domestic violence organisations, many of whom are reliant on decreasing levels of 
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